89 Connect › Forums › Civil Society › Are we Justified in Condemning the Moral Beliefs of Other Cultures?
Tagged: cultural, cultures, europe, european union, moral belief, philosophy, relativism
- This topic has 1 reply, 2 voices, and was last updated 21/10/2019, 15:21 by Elisa Perez.
30/09/2019 at 15:46 #265889 InitiativeParticipant409 PointsHalfway
By Verena Zimmermann, 89 Scotland
Today the question whether we are justified in condemning the moral beliefs of other cultures is generally answered in the negative – thankfully. After centuries of exploiting and oppressing indigenous people abroad and minorities at home, Europe is right to be extremely cautious when making judgements about different cultural practices. At the same time, EU foreign policy is – at least theoretically – based on universal human rights. Embracing human rights adds up to the belief thatsome rights are held by everybody. This in turn assumes that some moral rules apply no matter where you are from and what your beliefs are. In other words, moral beliefs that conflict with human rights are wrong. We are therefore justified to condemn those.
It seems then that we hold contradicting beliefs. On the one hand, we embrace ethical relativism – the belief that there exist no objective and universal valid moral principles which all actions can be evaluated against. After all, who’s to judge what is right and wrong? On the other hand, we seem to uphold ethical objectivism. According to this view, there are certain fundamental moral principles that apply to everyone everywhere – no matter someone’s cultural, temporal and environmental background. It is wrong to kill innocents. This is true regardless of what society you belong to and what you think. Some moral rules, like those established in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, are thus objectively true.
However, upholding both beliefs would be an inconsistent foreign policy strategy for the EU to adopt. So which theory should be discarded? Let us turn to ethical relativism first. Is it not a legitimate assumption that different societies value different moral principles? Many examples support this stance. The European Union, for instance, condemns discrimination on the basis of gender in any form (see for example the International Convent of Civil and Political rights). In many other countries however, it is morally permissible. Similarly, abortion is deemed to be a violation of moral principles by the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Men while it is not in by the European Convention of Human Rights. It seems safe to say that moral standards do not apply universally. Does this not prove that ethical objectivism is less plausible for it appears to be incompatible with cultural variation?
It does not. According to ethical relativism, the right- or wrongness of an action can be judged on the basis of the society to which the actor belongs. However, evaluating the morality of an action following this method is extremely hard. This is because it is notoriously difficult to choose the society by which the moral rightness of an individual’s action is to be determined. The problem is that one individual may belong to various different societies. For example, George, a Greek citizen and deeply devoted Mormon is required by the moral principles of his country to serve his Greece either by doing military or alternative service. On the other hand, according to his religious community it is morally wrong to prioritize service to the country and he should instead volunteer as a missionary after finishing school. Is it right for him to join the armed forces? Or is this morally wrong? Can he choose what society he primarily belongs to? But now suppose he has the desire to torture someone. If he joins a torturing society, are his actions morally right? This would mean that all you need to do to act morally right is find a small subculture that approves of whatever action. It seems impossible to use the relativists approach to determine whether or not it is right for individuals to act in a certain way. Similarly, it will be difficult for EU foreign policy makers to locate the right moral principle by which to evaluate other states actions. Is Saudi Arabia to be judged by the human rights standards of the international society or rather by the morality of Islam?
One major concern is that giving preference to some moral principles over others is discriminative and intolerant. Relativism on the other hand, is argued to entail tolerance. Since tolerance clearly seems to be a virtue for the EU who has introduced a “tolerance law” in 2012, ethical relativism may after all seem like the better alternative to adopt by European nations. This belief is often supported by the claim that there is no universal basis for judging other society against. From this, it follows that we ought to be tolerant of the moralities of other cultures.
However, this argument is mistaken. It seems to assume that tolerance is exempted from ethical relativism by suggesting that everyone ought to be tolerant of the moralities of other cultures. But this would in turn mean that at least one universal moral principle exists: the principle of tolerance. Yet, according to relativism it is just as good to be morally tolerant as it is to be intolerant. Hence, given that the fundamental importance of tolerance can only consistently be argued for from the point of ethical objectivism, the EU better turns to ethical objectivism as the philosophical foundation for justifying its foreign policy.
Many citizens and politicians who preach tolerance might still feel uneasy about this conclusion. And given European’s past as ruthless imperialists, rightly so. This feeling, however, may largely be due to a conceptional confusion of ethical relativism. It is important to note that cultural relativism and ethical relativism are distinct concepts. This distinction is crucial to understanding why ethical objectivism is compatible with cultural variation. Objectivism does not claim that all moral standards apply universally. Only some moral principles are universally valid, while others are not. Cultural relativism arises when the same basic moral principles are applied in different living situations. For example, the major difference between pro-life and pro-choice supporters is not whether it is permissible to kill innocent life but rather whether a foetus is already a living being in the relevant sense. The fact that women are taken to be completely equal to men under European law, while this is not the case in other parts of the world is not because the Europeans believe that treating women well is a moral duty and others do not. All cultures adhere to this principle but in specific situations different outcomes may be generated. Hence, although moral rightness and wrongness of certain actions sometimes vary from society to society, this does not mean that there are no universal moral standards held by all societies. They are judged differently due to being situated in different societies but will ultimately be explained by referring to a basic universal moral principle.
Thus, the next question we have to ask is whether human rights resemble those basic moral principles. To establish this, a further argument is required. But assuming that it can be defended successfully, it turns out that we are indeed justified in condemning some “cultural” practises of other societies (and possibly also our own). The EU is therefore right to lecture other states, such as Egypt, on human rights. The principle of freedom of torture and the right to a free trial are among those fundamental rights that pertain to all societies and cannot be circumvented by alleged differences between the European and Egyptian society. Since cultural relativism is not the same as ethical relativism and tolerance can only be defended by rejecting the latter, the EU’s resolution condemning human rights violations in Egypt and elsewhere is supported by philosophical arguments for ethical objectivism.
The European elections are over. Now one of the most important events for the future of the European Union is about to begin. The appointment of the President of the European Commission is often overlooked as it is decided by the European Council (i.e. The Council of the heads of State and Government of every EU Member State) and the European Parliament (EP) without direct consultation to the citizens. As explained in a previous post, this is not a flaw but a democratic choice involving the design and functioning of the European Union (EU).
The process to appoint the President of the European Commission is regulated in the Treaty of the European Union (TEU). Unsurprisingly the process is opaque. It leaves many questions unanswered regarding its functioning. The appointment involves two different stages. First, the European Council nominates a candidate for President by: (i) ‘Taking into account the results of the European elections’, and (ii) ‘after having held the appropriate consultations.’ The last stage involves a confirmatory vote by the EP. A rejection would entail the nomination of a new candidate by the European Council.
It is unclear to what extent the European Council is bound by the European elections results. There is no explicit obligation in the TEU to nominate a particular candidate. This may lead to a dead-end as the European Council cannot force its own choice on the EP. On the other hand, the EP can only confirm or reject the candidate proposed by the European Council. Both institutions have their own limitations. They must engage in dialogue or face deadlock.
In 2009 the Lisbon Treaty introduced the current appointment process. To add democratic legitimacy to the President of the European Commission it gave a confirmatory vote to the EP, a directly elected institution. This idea is constructive as it is problematic. Giving new powers to the EP is something that should be praised as an attempt to consolidate institutional balance in the EU. This means reducing the scope of powers of the European Council and increasing the prominence of the EP. The shortcoming is the risk of politicising the European Commission. Firstly, because the Commission is essentially a technocratic institution and as such it is better to shield it from the turbulence of an electoral process. The EP has understood the election results as a mandate to appoint the leading candidate of the European party that wins the election (the so called spitzenkandidat). This process looks good on paper but it may fail to deliver positive results.
According to the Eurobarometer Survey (February-March 2019), 70% of EU citizens do not remember ads in the media encouraging people to vote in the European elections (2019). Similarly, a post European elections survey (2014) from the Directorate General for Communication showed surprising results. 42% of the EU citizens considered that they did not have sufficient information to vote. Giving citizens the chance to have a say on the European Commission without providing information on the importance of such vote is dangerous and unfair. As the statistics show, this remains a critical issue that has not been properly addressed by the EU and its Member States after the treaty reform in 2009.
The goal pursued by the drafters of the EU treaties seems to be the creation of a framework in which both EU institutions are able to reach consensus between their preferred candidates. Reality has proved to be different. The EP has interpreted the process as a one side choice. For the EP the leading candidate of the European party with the largest number of MEPs should be nominated as President of the European Commission. This is not surprising considering that the EP seems to have the upper hand. It has the final say to confirm the nominated candidate. In case of rejection it will force the European Council to restart the nomination process with a new candidate. The question is if this prerogative could be used and reused to force its own choice on the European Council.
A key factor: The European elections results
The European elections results could play a decisive role to increase or reduce the scope of influence of the EP. If the EP is fragmented then the European Council will have more leverage in the appointment process. Fragmentation in Parliament will be the consequence of an unclear mandate from EU citizens. This should also be interpreted as a choice to give the European Council a more prominent role in the appointment process. The opposite consequence will take place in case the EP is less fragmented. The results of the European elections in 2019 show a hung Parliament. The share of vote is dispersed across different parties. The percentage of seats is distributed as follows: The European People’s Party (23.83%), the Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (20.37%), the Alliance for Liberals and Democrats (14.11%), Greens (9.99%), other parties (31.69%). The election results give more leverage to the European Council. It could extract more concessions from a divided Parliament. Unless there is a coalition between the parties. The upcoming appointment of the President of the European Commission is a great opportunity to test institutional balance in the EU. A nice opportunity to watch the institutions wrestling in the EU arena. At this point it is uncertain who will be appointed as President. However, before the race has begun there may be a clear winner: the EU’s democratic credentials.
21/10/2019 at 15:21 #3054Elisa PerezParticipant309 PointsHalfway
I love being European because of our ability to question ourselves. This may come from the fact the European Union is the gathering of many different cultures, reunited together for the benefit of all. So, from a certain point of view, tolerance is in our DNA, I’d say. And compromises too. Both of these characteristics are valuable, but also source of weakness when confronting with different kind of countries. There are cultures based on religion which couldn’t possibly question themselves without risking to make the entire system collapse. There are leaders who consider themselves the holders of the only Truth. And so on. This to say that, although I find admirable to question ourselves between us to reach a common point of view or some sort of it, I believe that EU can be a little more strong when condemning those behaviors which do not meet its own beliefs. For the sake of its own reputation, both at a regional and international level.
And now I come to the European elections. In many debates on this platform I’ve read condemnations against the European voters’ indifference regarding the European elections. Point is, I am afraid, that we all are Europeans, but not all of us feel that way. The European Union was born for economic purposes, and it still feel just that, an economic agreement. And economics, especially at an high level, does not touch the heart of the people.
But fighting for what do you believe it is right does. Take a strong position against injustice or violation of the human rights is powerful. Feeling to be united by something more than an economic strategy really makes the difference.
Of course we can talk about the best electoral system we should implement (which it is indeed a relevant point for the situation), but since the topic started with those premises about ethics and moral, I just wanted to say something related to that.
- You must be logged in to reply to this topic.
Comments are closed.